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1. Introduction 
IT IS PERHAPS early to draw lessons from the crisis that has hit the global economy. The crisis appears severe and widespread, its effects far-reaching and long-lasting. Measures of various kinds have been taken or are in the process of being taken 
regarding monetary policy, the use of public resources and the revision of rules and 
institutions on which the proper functioning of the markets and the operation of 
fi nancial intermediaries depend. The present is undoubtedly a period of maximum 
efforts on the part of economic policy and overall political action, efforts that are 
directly proportional to the seriousness of the crisis. But this is also a moment 
in which the interpretative models used in analyzing our economies start being 
reconsidered and attempts are being made at identifying the reasons underlying 
the failures of markets, economic policies and economists’ forecasts. Besides, this is 
also necessary in order to better defi ne interventions – global, substantial, focused 
and lasting – aimed at overcoming the crisis and, as far as possible, preventing, with 
the design of new rules, new institutions and new policies, such serious instability 
from occurring again. If overcoming the crisis will be arduous and complex, the 
process of revising the theoretical and quantitative frameworks of analysis, and the 
domestic and supranational guidelines and instruments of economic and fi nancial 
policy will be equally diffi cult and laborious. 
To begin, one can and certainly must ask how seriously economic analysis, 
together with forecasting models, has failed, but also why economic policy, 
in its various forms, has been so late to respond to the alarms of economists’ 
analyses and forecasts. This is the subject I should like to address briefl y in what 
follows, while anticipating an obvious answer: if economic policy bears serious 
*Originally published in BIS Review 49/2009. 
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responsibilities, economic analysis and forecasting models have also shown 
important limitations that must be addressed. 
2. Origins of the crisis and the economists’ diagnosis 
Until two years ago the world economy had known an exceptionally long 
period of rapid expansion, with much smaller GDP growth rate fl uctuations than 
in preceding periods, accompanied by low and stable infl ation in practically all 
the main areas of the globe. Thanks also to the high economic growth rates of 
large emerging countries, consensus forecasts were for continuing and relatively 
stable growth. That confi dence was gradually eroded by the events that occurred 
between the summer of 2007 and the autumn of last year and collapsed rapidly 
in the last few months, giving way to a pronounced and generalized increase in 
the volatility of markets and economic activity and widespread uncertainty about 
the future. 
As is well known, the fi rst signs of the crisis we are passing through were 
the diffi culties encountered by intermediaries that had invested massively in 
“structured” fi nancial products, linked to the performance of mortgage loans 
(and hence of the prices of the underlying real estate) granted in the United 
States to borrowers with low credit ratings (so-called subprime borrowers). The 
crisis spread rapidly to other segments of the fi nancial market and, in the last few 
months, to the real economy. The seat of infection was set in fact in a broader 
context of fragility of the international fi nancial and economic system. The 
problems that emerged in 2007 in the markets of structured products linked to 
subprime mortgages triggered the crisis, but the conditions for it to take hold and 
spread rapidly had gradually accumulated over time. The pre-existent elements of 
fragility and potential instability had already been partly identifi ed and indicated 
as possible sources of danger. 
Economic, demographic and technological changes 
Great changes have taken place in the last twenty years, in terms of the 
integration of economies and markets, demographic movements and technological 
and fi nancial innovation. The growth in world trade of goods and services was 
extremely rapid, as was that in foreign direct investment. The emerging Asian 
economies now account for more than a quarter of world exports, twice the 
level in 1990. In little more than a decade, direct investment rose from 10 per 
cent of world GDP in 1995 to 25 per cent, with the advanced and emerging 
economies recording similar increases. Financial integration increased remarkably: 
in 2007 the ratio of foreign fi nancial assets and liabilities to GDP was equal to 
300 per cent in the advanced economies, compared with 140 per cent in 1995, 
when the prevailing expectations were for rapid growth in both the emerging 
and developing countries, in conjunction with the progressive removal of the 
constraints on the mobility of capital. Globalization has obviously brought a 
large increase in countries’ interdependence and accordingly in the probability 
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of cross-border transmission of real and fi nancial shocks. At the same time the 
greater risk diversifi cation associated with the increase in the global exposure of 
fi nancial portfolios should have produced, at least in principle, a smaller exposure 
to perturbations of a local nature. 
As regards demography, the very rapid population growth in the 
developing economies has begun to be matched by a progressive ageing of 
the population in the industrial countries and in some of the large emerging 
economies as well (especially China). The increase in life expectancy has gone 
hand in hand with the reduction in births, causing a sharp rise in old-age 
dependency ratios (of the elderly in relation to the population of working age), 
which is set to continue in the coming decades. This has led to a downward trend 
for public pensions and an increase in supplementary pension schemes offered 
by pension funds, insurance companies and other institutional investors. In the 
meantime households’ direct exposure to fi nancial risk has grown: in 2008 in the 
three largest euro-area countries the proportion of households’ fi nancial assets 
administered by these intermediaries has reached about one third, up by about 10 
percentage points since 1995. 
Lastly, the development of new information and communication 
technologies has had a growing impact on every sector of the economy, and society 
in general. This has had important effects on productivity and economic growth, 
and on all the building blocks of the fi nancial system, from payment system 
infrastructure to intermediaries, and from markets to investment instruments. 
In particular, the securitization of banks’ assets expanded considerably, together 
with the supply of so-called structured fi nancial instruments (ABSs, CDOs, 
etc.) whose valuation is generally rather complex. The traditional model of credit 
intermediation thus gave way, especially in the United States, to a system in which 
loans granted were rapidly transformed into other fi nancial products having these 
loans as collateral and sold on the market: the so-called originate-to-distribute 
model. These instruments – intended in principle to reduce risk, by redistributing 
it among a multitude of investors, free up capital and hence boost banks’ ability 
to lend – helped to fi nance the “new economy”, in parallel with the spread of new 
technologies. At the same time they made it possible to reduce the cost of loans, 
above all as a result of the compression of illiquidity premiums. 
The complexity of structured instruments was coupled, however, with a 
lack of transparency, in particular as regards their valuation (in which a crucial 
role was played by rating agencies, without any particular control by regulatory 
authorities or information providers), by means of statistical models and often 
carried out on the basis of incomplete and insuffi cient data. We can now say 
– unfortunately well into the fi nancial crisis – that opportunistic behaviour by 
managers, fueled by a distorted system of incentives, especially with reference 
to executive compensation, led to the creation of unnecessarily complex and 
opaque fi nancial assets, with the effect of preventing a correct assessment of 
creditworthiness and often causing excessive risk-taking. 
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The unsustainable growth of external imbalances 
In this context more and more in recent years the model of growth 
of the world economy was based on a growing imbalance between a steadily 
declining US saving rate (negative for the household sector) and highly positive 
rates for China and other emerging countries (as well as Japan). This led to 
large external defi cits for the United States and huge surpluses for the rapidly 
growing countries, which served to fi nance the twin (budget and external 
current account) defi cits of the United States. This was soon recognized since 
the unsustainability of growing current account imbalances was evident, even 
though variations in the value of fi nancial assets and liabilities contributed to 
reducing the explosive expansion of the country’s net external position (Figure 1). 
The risks associated with such a growth model, in which the rapid expansion of 
the world’s largest economy was fi nanced with capital from the rest of the world, 
including, somewhat paradoxically, emerging and developing countries, had 
been stressed repeatedly and from many sides, although there was no lack of less 
alarmed observers and analyses suggesting that what appeared to be fundamental 
imbalances in the external accounts were the result of sustainable developments. 
At all events, the analyses produced by government and international institutions 
regularly pointed to the possibility that those imbalances might give rise to rapid 
and disorderly adjustments, with sudden realignments of the external value of 
the dollar and abrupt falls in US domestic demand, as the main threat to stable 
growth of the world economy. 
In the end, the fi nancial crisis was not provoked by a fl ight from the dollar 
but by the slump in the US housing market and the consequent depreciation of 
structured fi nancial products. This initial spark found ideal tinder in the general 
vulnerability, and the crisis spread like wildfi re, encountering no particular 
obstacles. For that matter, the US trade defi cit was nothing but the counter-item 
to the insuffi ciency of saving, above all by American households, over-indebted 
and holding assets consisting largely of long-overvalued real estate that was itself 
used as collateral for fi nancial derivatives. The sharp drop in demand in the 
United States is apparently being accompanied by an effective adjustment of these 
disequilibria, an exceedingly abrupt correction imposed by the crisis. However, 
for this adjustment to be carried through and the imbalances defi nitively rectifi ed, 
there must be an expansion of fi nal demand, consumer demand in particular, 
in the countries that are running large external current account surpluses. It is 
too early to conclude that this will actually be the outcome of the measures now 
being taken, but economic analysis had correctly discerned the dangers of the 
disequilibria and the inevitability of an adjustment – the longer postponed, the 
more traumatic. 
Although they were discussed in a number of forums for international 
coordination, the corrective measures needed to remedy matters were never 
undertaken resolutely enough. The increase in fi nal demand led by the US 
expansion was accompanied by the extraordinarily rapid growth of economic 
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activity and exports in the large emerging economies (accentuated by policies that 
impeded exchange rate adjustments) and unprecedented strains in the markets 
for raw materials. In recent years, given the low price elasticity of energy demand 
and supply, this resulted in an equally extraordinary rise in energy prices and the 
steady increase in the trade surplus of oil-producing countries (Figure 1). This 
was an additional factor of global payments disequilibria and a source of fi nance 
for fi nal demand in the United States. 
Monetary policy and fi nancial and real asset prices 
In the absence of worrisome infl ationary tensions, for over a decade 
monetary policies were kept very expansive. Low nominal and real interest rates 
ushered in not only the long period of exceptionally rapid and stable growth of 
global output but also a powerful expansion of monetary and credit aggregates. 
This was accompanied by a sharp increase in the liquidity of markets, which in 
its turn was connected with fi nancial innovation and the strong growth of such 
institutional investors as pension funds and hedge funds. The upshot was a large, 
across-the-board reduction in risk premiums, which fell to extremely low levels 
by historical standards, in all markets (shares, corporate bonds, real estate). The 
most benevolent interpretations saw this as evidence that the world economy 
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Figure 1: Cumulative current account balances
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had entered a new phase, the “Great Moderation,” marked by rapid growth 
without signifi cant fl uctuations and by orderly price movements, anchored to 
low average levels of infl ation. The advent of that phase, it was argued, was the 
result of economic policies effectively oriented to macroeconomic stability, and 
in particular of monetary policies credibly directed to containing infl ationary 
pressures and preserving the value of money. The result, ran the argument, was 
a stable, certain outlook, conditions propitious to private initiative and hence to 
economic growth. 
This interpretation (based on “good policy”, the standard term used in the 
literature, as well as on the supposed effects of positive structural changes with 
the spread of new technologies) was disputed by other analysts. These asserted 
that the protracted, orderly growth and modest fl uctuations was actually the 
product of exceptionally favourable circumstances, in particular the absence of 
the sort of violent, repeated, adverse shocks that had marked previous periods 
(“good luck”). Sooner or later, they argued, in an environment that in a number 
of ways had not changed radically from the previous decades, this largely 
expansive monetary policy, by encouraging and in practice fi nancing high risk-
taking, would bring about the conditions for abrupt corrections as soon as risk 
perception and propensity changed. This danger was signalled by a good many 
observers, and starting in 2004 there were particular warnings that too casual an 
attitude towards risk-taking might be followed by a disorderly, traumatic reaction 
in the opposite direction. In the light of events, the optimistic interpretation of 
world economic trends in recent decades was clearly indulgent. While there is no 
denying the contribution of good policy, and especially its impact on medium-
term infl ation expectations, it is now evident that it would probably have been 
wiser to take greater precautions against the possibility of an erroneous, falsely 
reassuring reading of events. 
On a number of occasions the fall in risk premiums pushed bond, 
stock and real-estate prices up to levels that were clearly unjustifi ed by the 
fundamentals. The consensus view, in the framework generally known as “fl exible 
infl ation targeting” (which authoritative commentators have used, broadly, also 
to describe the policy of the Federal Reserve), is that monetary policymakers need 
not worry about countering speculative bubbles in asset prices. What matters is 
that they take them into account in their forecasts of the variables that are factors 
in determining the general level of prices, such as infl ation expectations and the 
deviation of fi nal demand from the “potential” level of economic activity (i.e. that 
corresponding to full use of productive resources). The sole tool at policymakers’ 
disposal (the interest rate) should accordingly be deployed in order to attain 
just one objective, namely fl exibly preserving the value of money, since it cannot 
aim simultaneously at curbing the rise in the prices of fi nancial and real assets. 
Obviously, in memory of lessons from long ago, in order to avoid the depressive 
effects of the bursting of an asset bubble monetary policy must react swiftly to cut 
interest rates and expand liquidity. 
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Actually, the impact of asset prices on the spending and investment 
decisions of households and fi rms also depends on their relative indebtedness, 
and all the more so insofar as the latter depends on the collateral represented by 
their capital goods (for households, mostly residential property). This applies 
above all to the anglo-saxon economies, and it is a potential factor of non-linear 
amplifi cation of the effects of changes in real and fi nancial asset values. In this 
case monetary policy, even under fl exible infl ation targeting, could be called on 
directly to counter very large variations in those prices, especially considering 
that a tightening of bank credit becomes more likely as the level of indebtedness 
increases. In the long run, holding policy interest rates steady while share or 
house prices are soaring, in a context of heavy and growing household and 
corporate debt, could further fuel a speculative bubble that will eventually burst, 
at a potentially very severe cost to the economy as a whole. 
Yet this, in practice, was the policy followed for decades by the Fed and 
the Bank of England, vis-à-vis both the stock market boom of the late 1990s 
(Figures 2, 3) and the housing boom (Figures 4, 5, 6). Admittedly, in the 
former case this benign neglect during the boom and the drastic lowering of 
interest rates during the subsequent market downswing had relatively limited 
consequences (especially by contrast with Japan’s disheartening “lost decade” 
of defl ation starting in the early 1990s). The case of house prices, however, is 
seemingly quite different. On the one hand the rise in prices, though strong and 
sustained (likely exceeding the levels justifi ed by fundamentals), was probably less 
“explosive” in the United States than in some other countries, such as the United 
Figure 2: Stock market indices in real terms
Source: Thomson Financial Datastream.
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Source: Thomson Financial Datastream.
Figure 3: Price/earnings ratio of the US stock market
Sources: Sources: Japan: Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism; United 
Kingdom: Nationwide; United States (a): FHFA and (b) Standard and Poor’s Case-
Shiller 10-City Home Price Composite Index; and Sweden: Statistics Sweden.
Note: Defl ated using consumer price indices.
Figure 4: House prices in real terms (1)
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Sources: France: INSEE; Germany: Deutsche Bundesbank; Netherlands: Nederlandsche Bank; 
Spain: Ministerio de la Vivienda; and Italy: based on “Il consulente immobiliare” and 
Istat data.
Notes:  (1) Defl ated using consumer price indices. – (2) For 2008, average of the fi rst three 
quarters.
Figure 5: House prices in real terms (1)
Sources: Based on FHFA, Nationwide and national statistics. For the methodology, see Finicelli, 
A., “House price developments and fundamentals in the United States, Banca d’Italia, 
Questioni di Economia e Finanza, no. 7, 2007.
Figure 6: Difference between observed and theoretical house prices (1)
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Kingdom and Sweden (but also Spain and the Netherlands) when gauged by the 
Federal Housing Finance Agency index (but equally so if measured by the Case-
Shiller index).1 On the other hand, however, the devastating repercussions on US 
fi nancial markets and intermediaries (transmitted worldwide through structured 
fi nancial products) stemmed precisely from the interaction with the levels of debt 
of American households, spurred by the possibility that rising house prices offered 
for mortgage equity withdrawal. In many cases their debt came to exceed their 
home equity. 
In this way, the expansion of liquidity and so of credit was accompanied 
by the ratcheting up of fi nancial leverage, prompted among other things by the 
emergence of new business models. In his re-examination of the Depression in 
1933, Irving Fisher noted: “Easy money is the great cause of overborrowing. 
When an investor thinks he can make over 100 per cent per annum by borrowing 
at 6 per cent, he will be tempted to borrow, and to invest or speculate with 
borrowed money. This was a prime cause leading to the over-indebtedness of 
1929. Inventions and technological improvements created wonderful investment 
opportunities, and so caused big debts” (Fisher, 1933, p. 348; emphasis 
added). In Fisher’s view, that is, depressions stem from excessive debt exposures 
(inevitably accompanied, one might add, by excessive risk-taking); sooner or 
later, a correction is inevitable. Once the correction gets under way, the impellent 
necessity of rapidly reducing excessive leverage exacerbates the fall in asset prices, 
which is the more violent, the larger the original bubble. And the price collapse, 
in turn, amplifi es fi nancial leverage, making the de-leveraging all the more 
painful. This danger had long been known to economists. 
3. From economists’ diagnosis to pre-crisis policies 
If economic analysis had effectively pointed out some of the looming 
dangers, the potential sources of infection and the mechanisms of propagation, 
then why was economic policy action for so long hesitant, sluggish, lacking in 
international coordination? To some extent this may have been due to the generic 
nature of the alarms sounded by economists, their failure to pinpoint the origins 
and course of development of the crisis, or the very reiteration of warnings when 
their fears did not materialize, giving policymakers the idea that the risks were 
vague and remote. But we can also fi nd causes not only in connection with 
economic analysis but also within the policy decision-making process itself. 
In the fi rst place, until the crisis was full-blown and the spectre was 
raised of dramatic, dire developments in the fi nancial markets, there was a lack 
of international coordination and an inability to take measures to counter the 
increasingly rapid build-up of balance-of-payments disequilibria and the effects 
of a disproportionate rise in international liquidity. There was undoubtedly 
awareness of the paradox of industrialized countries being increasingly fi nanced 
by the current account surpluses of developing countries. It was clear that for an 
unusually long time this had determined particularly low levels of interest rates 
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and volatility in the prices of fi nancial instruments. And with US monetary policy 
maintaining an expansionary stance (too) long after the brief recession of 2001-
02, this had transmitted to the Chinese economy, given the prevailing exchange 
rate system, an impetus whose signs could be seen globally in the spiralling prices 
of raw materials. All of this was discussed repeatedly at academic conferences, 
central bank workshops, international consultations and offi cial meetings of 
ministers and central bank governors. But only the sense of extreme urgency that 
spread last autumn following the failure of Lehman Brothers made it possible 
to begin to shape a coordinated response. In the future, it will be necessary 
to intensify efforts in this direction, including by fi nding appropriate ways of 
translating into action, in more binding forms, the interventions decided by the 
institutions responsible for overseeing the international economy. 
The reassuring, understandable belief that a new world had emerged – one 
of Great Moderation – perhaps also led to overestimation of the economy’s ability 
to absorb shocks. This belief was reinforced by the apparent ease and limited 
costs with which the global economy overcame the diffi culties that loomed large 
at times in the course of recent years, from the fi nancial crises of the countries 
of South-East Asia and Russia to the collapse of LTCM, the defl ation of the 
stock market bubble in 2000-01 and the shock caused by the terrorist attacks of 
11 September 2001. In particular, the bursting of the so-called dot-com bubble 
had seemed to be controlled with ease; given the seriousness of the concerns 
expressed beforehand and looking back on the modest scale of the damage and 
the remarkable effectiveness of the countermeasures adopted, the conclusion was 
drawn that the evolution of that crisis had confi rmed both the advent of the Great 
Moderation and the merits of good policy. 
However, as already observed, there was much debate then, and there 
still is today, about whether monetary policy should not pay more attention 
to fi nancial and real asset price trends and to the pro-cyclical growth of credit 
and leverage, and in some instances respond decisively to seemingly “excessive” 
movements. Aside from the diffi culty of defi ning what excessive means in practice, 
it is certainly useful to examine the factors that determine particularly large 
swings in these prices, just as it is necessary to shed light on the factors that tend 
to threaten fi nancial stability and disproportionately amplify cyclical fl uctuations. 
Many of these factors probably originate not so much in behaviour as in rules and 
incentives existing in the markets. In the case, for example, of the mortgage loans 
that triggered the current crisis due to excessive borrowing, two factors surely 
played a crucial role: (1) the assumption that the continuous rise in house prices 
would lower the amount of debt in relation to the value of the underlying asset 
over time, and (2) the possibility of obtaining mortgages with loan-to-value ratios 
of 100 per cent and more. In these cases, and as has long been acknowledged (for 
example, with reference to the sharp rise in house prices in the United Kingdom 
recorded in the early 2000s), it is obvious that it is necessary to resort not so 
much to monetary policy but to prudential instruments, with limits on the value 
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of collateral that can be used in taking out a loan. The question is why steps of 
this kind were not taken, quite apart from the failure to use monetary policy 
(naturally as a possible second-best instrument). 
In the same way, it is legitimate to wonder whether confi dence in the 
ability of fi nancial markets to regulate themselves was not excessive. What role 
was played, in particular, by the waiving of stricter supervision in many sectors 
of fi nancial intermediation? This, even disregarding the strength of lobbies and 
instances of excessive proximity between the supervisors and the supervised. In 
any event, it is clear that the consequences of a change of trend in the perception 
and concentration of risks were seriously underestimated, notwithstanding the 
many analyses and signals that had become available in recent years. 
Excessive deregulation of the fi nancial sphere was also accompanied, as 
recalled earlier, by an unprecedented development of fi nancial innovation. There 
was an enormous increase in the supply of complex instruments for hedging 
risk, structured products often very diffi cult to value if not using mathematical-
statistical techniques whose application presupposed at least three conditions: (1) 
the availability of the basic information necessary to determine the quality of the 
products (securities or loans) underlying these instruments (in other words, the 
likelihood of the loans and bonds being honoured); (2) the validity, essentially 
over time and in the real world, of the arbitrage principle; and (3) a suffi ciently 
high degree of liquidity in the markets. It is certainly open to doubt whether 
much thought was given to the soundness of these basic hypotheses, either by the 
regulators or by bankers and investors.  
Much remains to be done then, in the process of reviewing the rules 
and institutions responsible – including at supranational level – for the proper 
functioning of the markets, the prudent management of fi nancial intermediaries 
and the valuation of investment and risk-hedging instruments. The path of 
economic and fi nancial development of the modern economies is, however, 
littered with episodes of excess, speculative bubbles and failures linked to 
highly imprudent if not criminal practices. If, on one level, the challenge lies 
in not falling into the opposite excess of exaggerated and obsessive regulation 
(bearing in mind that the hedging of risk, when properly identifi ed and where 
possible, is right and proper), on another level I believe we must be aware of 
our position between the rock of market failures and the whirlpool of policy 
failures. The thesis I fi nd most convincing is that the area where most errors 
were made, precisely because there was enough evidence at a macroeconomic 
level to act in time, was in the lack (beyond the declarations and press releases at 
G7 meetings), of suffi ciently decisive policy reactions to the external imbalances 
that began to expand rapidly from the second half of the 1990s. Essentially 
these disequilibria refl ected continuous and sustained growth in fi nal demand, 
especially consumption demand, in the leading economic region of the planet, 
fi nanced by over-borrowing, primarily from abroad; growth, in short, without the 
accumulation of savings. 
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To conclude on policies and to support my previous point, I believe that 
aside from a logical interpretation of what provoked the current crisis, it is useful 
to propose a chronological reconstruction of the sequence of events that have 
marked the last ten to fi fteen years. I propose the following summary, which 
admittedly is perhaps a little too USA-centric: 
1. The revolution in the new information and communication 
technologies halted the progressive decline of productivity growth in 
the United States, which returned to markedly high rates of expansion 
in the second half of the 1990s. 
2. During the same period, following the fi nancial crises that hit the 
countries of South-East Asia and Russia (1997-98) and the collapse 
of LTCM (autumn 1998), the Federal Reserve’s policy remained 
essentially accommodating, with a strong expansion of liquidity also to 
counter the so-called millennium bug. 
3. The “new economy” euphoria, beyond being compatible with 
objective interpretations of the increases in productivity linked to the 
introduction and spread of the new technologies, was refl ected in US 
household consumption, with a rapid rise in debt and a sustained 
decline in savings, but with fi nancial positions basically in balance 
thanks to the increase in net wealth due to capital gains, in part the 
result of soaring share prices during the dot-com bubble. 
4. The powerful expansion in US fi nal demand and imports was 
gradually accompanied by growth in the exports and output of the 
major emerging economies such as China and India, which had 
previously lagged behind, and an upwards trend in US infl ation, 
dealt with by a tightening of monetary policy at the beginning 
of 2000.  
5. Monetary tightening ended by bursting, late, the dot-com bubble in 
2000-01. The recessionary effects of this were compounded by those 
of the severe shock of the September 2001 terrorist attacks. 
6. Amid fears of recession and defl ationary conditions of the kind that 
had prevailed in the previous decade in Japan, the Federal Reserve’s 
response was again very accommodating. A drastic reduction in 
interest rates was accompanied by a strongly expansionary budgetary 
policy, which remained in place also in relation to the war operations 
in the Middle East. 
7. Monetary policy also remained expansionary for a long time, 
facilitating a return to sustained growth in household consumption, 
not countering the trend towards a zero saving rate, and giving free 
rein to fi nancial innovation, in conditions of abundant liquidity, 
especially with the repackaging in 2004-06 of mortgages – in a 
context of constantly rising house prices – into structured products 
that opened up new investment possibilities to banks.  
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8. The growing US current account defi cit was accompanied by ever-
larger surpluses in emerging countries and Japan, with a signifi cant 
build-up of offi cial reserves, in a context of a relatively sluggish rise in 
domestic consumption demand and saving rates even higher than the 
nonetheless elevated rates of investment. The oil-producing countries 
also recorded sharply higher trade surpluses, refl ecting the rise in oil 
prices due to the expansion of global demand. 
9. The increase in international liquidity connected with the growing 
payments imbalances and the Fed’s accommodating monetary 
policy – which contributed, given the limited fl exibility of emerging 
countries’ currencies and the Chinese renminbi in particular, to the 
global economic expansion – led to a prolonged period, from 2004 
to 2007, of low price volatility in fi nancial markets and low nominal 
yields. This was also due to the large volume of investment in fi xed 
income securities by international investors and countries that had 
accumulated high levels of reserves by running large and rising 
current account surpluses. 
10. The upshot was the search by investors – including international banks 
and banks of other countries and fi nancial vehicles they controlled 
– for investments with higher risk-return profi les and the attendant 
supply of structured fi nancial instruments backed mainly, although 
not exclusively, by home mortgages granted with loan-to¬value ratios 
exceeding even 100 per cent on the false premise that house prices 
could only increase. 
11. The strong expansion of global demand engendered infl ationary 
pressures, to which the monetary policy authorities responded, in 
part with a view to countering the possible impact on domestic prices 
of the expansion-driven increases in oil and raw material prices. The 
rise in interest rates was followed by the progressive defl ation of the 
real-estate bubble, which had a domino effect, particularly on the 
structured products created using subprime mortgages, with their 
higher default risk. 
12. In the summer of 2007 this triggered the fi nancial crisis, 
which, despite central banks’ prompt and massive response, has 
gradually turned into a global crisis affecting whole industries and 
economies. 
In this context, a crucial role was played by fi nancial regulation that 
was behind the curve, indeed entirely absent from some market segments. 
Speculative behaviour in the markets, the growth in leverage and the various 
kinds of pro-cyclicality operating at institutional level as well as in the decisions 
of market participants amplifi ed the centrifugal tendencies. At the root, however, 
there remain the large trade and current account imbalances that the countries 
participating in the global economy built up unchecked. 
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4. Aspects of the forecasting failure 
Macroeconomic forecasts – whether produced by private-sector analysts or 
by national and international research and policy institutions – are generally made 
using econometric statistical models estimated on “time series”, data referring to 
the past behaviour of economic, fi nancial and demographic variables that, on the 
basis of theory or statistical experience, are considered relevant for determining 
the variables of interest. In addition to the constraints suggested by their 
underlying theory, the different models incorporate to a varying degree the role 
of institutions, the rules prevailing in markets and the means and procedures of 
economic policy intervention. Although econometric model specifi cations often 
take into account the non-linearities that derive from accounting constraints, the 
fundamental non-linearities connected with genuine regime changes and that 
“are not found in the data” have to be addressed in an essentially discretionary 
manner. Forecasts are therefore conditional exercises conducted for given 
initial conditions of the endogenous variables “explained” by the model (the 
data observed at the time the forecast is made), “exogenous” variables (whose 
behaviour is considered to be basically independent of that of the endogenous 
variables), assumptions involving future policies and interventions taken to 
compensate for the basic “linearity” of the approaches used. Examining their 
performance, we fi nd that errors in forecasting aggregates such as GDP tend to be 
relatively small, even if not negligible, and to grow with the forecasting horizon. 
This is shown with reference to Italy in Figure 7, which compares the average 
errors of several forecasters for the period 1999¬2007. 
Note: Average of the forecasts made in the spring and autumn of each year by the Bank of Italy, 
Prometeia, Consensus Economics, the International Monetary Fund and the European 
Commission.
Figure 7: Average absolute error in the GDP growth rate in the period 
     1999-2007: comparison between the main forecasters
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Nevertheless, there is no doubt that forecasts were late to consider the 
consequences of the fi nancial crisis for economic growth. In the early months of 
2008, when strains in the interbank markets had already persisted for six months 
and were gradually spreading to other segments, the professional forecasters 
surveyed by Consensus Economics indicated on average that in 2009 GDP would 
grow by close to 3 per cent in the United States, 2 per cent in the euro area and 
1.5 per cent in Italy. In the course of 2008, as negative signals repeatedly came in 
and the state of the world economy worsened systematically, the estimates were 
revised downwards, but only very slowly until the autumn; as late as October (the 
month following the failure of Lehman Brothers), forecasters expected that GDP 
would expand, even if only modestly, in the United States, the euro area and 
Italy. Now, at the end of February 2009 and more than a year and a half since 
the outbreak of the crisis, GDP is expected to contract in 2009 by approximately 
2 per cent in all three of those economies. Within the span of one year, the GDP 
growth forecasts were revised downwards by 4-5 percentage points. These are 
adjustments of exceptional magnitude (Figures 8 and 9). 
Looking back at the last 18 months, with the benefi t of hindsight we see 
that the forecast-adjustment process was unable to keep pace with events, culpably 
endorsing, with obstinate short-sightedness until a few months ago, the view 
there would be a short and relatively mild economic slowdown. 
Forecasting models have experienced episodes of acute diffi culty in the 
past, especially in the presence of large and unprecedented shocks. Indeed, 
the effort to overcome the shortcomings that those episodes had revealed 
has been one of the main factors driving the development of forecasting 
instruments; aspects and mechanisms that had previously been neglected and 
whose importance was unexpectedly revealed have been gradually incorporated 
into successive generations of macroeconomic models. Furthermore, because 
forecasters are aware that all forecasting instruments are necessarily based on 
an incomplete and provisional knowledge of a continuously changing world, 
they have long recognized the advisability of adopting an approach based on a 
multiplicity of cross-checks. This constitutes a form of self-protection against 
the risk that the theoretical paradigms underlying the approximation of reality 
implicit in a model may prove particularly inadequate in certain situations. 
In addition, employing a battery of different instruments – from the grand 
econometric models in the tradition of Klein, Ando and Modigliani to the 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models, and including primarily 
statistical models such as vector autoregression (VAR) systems – makes it possible 
to fi lter and interpret more effectively the great mass of partial and fragmentary or 
even contradictory data that gradually become available. 
However, to quote Herbert Simon: “Good predictions have two 
requisites that are often hard to come by. First, they require either a theoretical 
understanding of the phenomena to be predicted, as a basis for the prediction 
model, or phenomena that are suffi ciently regular that they can simply be 
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extrapolated. Since the latter condition is seldom satisfi ed by data about human 
affairs (or even about the weather), our predictions will generally be only as good 
as our theories” (Simon 1981, p. 170). 
In effect, for a long time this crisis incubated in an environment that 
was beyond the ken of macroeconomic models and characterized by widespread 
opacity as to the actual soundness of the markets and individual participants. 
It was known that banks’ were holding toxic assets, but the total amount 
was unknown, let alone the distribution among intermediaries. Although 
macroeconomic repercussions appeared inevitable, it became possible to assess 
them more precisely only after the scale of the banking system’s diffi culties 
became clear in the autumn of 2008, generating widespread panic and sudden, 
generalized increases in risk aversion. The global contours of the crisis also 
have only become clear relatively recently. At fi rst the general view, with due 
exceptions, was that the crisis might be confi ned almost exclusively to the US 
domestic sphere and that the emerging economies might remain relatively 
immune (the so-called decoupling hypothesis, long considered plausible by 
some observers). Only of late has it become completely evident that this is not 
happening and that the whole world economy is deteriorating badly. 
Nevertheless, the failure to anticipate the evolution of the crisis under 
way is undeniable. In my opinion, it primarily refl ected limitations and 
shortcomings in three aspects of modeling and forecasting. In the fi rst place, 
when there are exceptional developments that constitute a discontinuity with 
the past, the statistical regularity Simon was referring to no longer obtains. The 
models, estimated on data plainly belonging to a different population than that 
involved in the forecast, cease providing a reliable representation of the way the 
economy works, often without even producing indications serving to identify 
the adjustments that could lessen the defi ciencies. Secondly, in the utilization 
of forecasts and even more in the way they are remembered, attention inevitably 
focuses on the numerical value (with its misleading appearance of precision) 
assigned to the result deemed most likely (the so-called point estimation), while 
the remarks concerning the forecasting uncertainty, the risks implied by scenarios 
other than the central scenario, which are nonetheless part of a systematic kit 
of forecasting analyses, are disregarded or at least rapidly forgotten. Lastly, the 
current generation of models of the economy has proved defi cient above all 
in representing the aspects that are most important in the transmission of the 
current crisis, those involving the interrelations between fi nancial markets and the 
real economy. 
Regularity and discontinuity 
As to the fi rst of the three shortcomings I mention, economic systems 
constantly evolve and transform themselves under the infl uence of: changes 
in institutional arrangements, legislative provisions and market regulation; 
the introduction of new technological paradigms; and the revised objectives, 
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strategies and methods of operation of policy-makers. The changes in the 
framework in which economic agents (consumers and businesses) make their 
decisions in turn lead to changes in their behaviour. When there is marked 
discontinuity with the past, such changes may be far-reaching and the past cease 
to provide a reliable guide. Models, by defi nition, refl ect historical experience 
in the values of their parameters – which are estimated for behavioural relations 
and calibrated for institutional mechanisms – and are therefore reliable when it 
is “business as usual”, that is, as long as the system they describe is not subjected 
to unaccustomed pressure. However, in this case it can be argued that their 
contribution to making right decisions is limited. On the other hand, they 
become unreliable precisely when, following signs of structural discontinuity, the 
need to predict the future is most urgent and the benefi ts of correct forecasting 
greatest,: yet that very discontinuity casts doubt on the use of models for 
fundamentally mechanical extrapolation. 
To a large extent the inability of models to cope with changes in the 
systems they describe is due to the way in which economic phenomena are 
represented, that is, using statistical and econometric techniques designed to 
reproduce, from a necessarily small number of parameters, relations that are 
suffi ciently stable over time. Anomalous observations that do not fi t the main 
mechanisms at work in the historical period used for the econometric estimate 
are frequently put aside: their information content is neutralized and therefore 
the model cannot take account of them. And yet those very deviations from 
the norm could provide precious information about the economy’s behaviour 
in conditions other than those usually prevailing. On the other hand, episodic 
observation of exceptional phenomena is inadequate to capture the often complex 
inter-relations between economic variables; it is only by building up a suffi cient 
number of observations that we can obtain a statistically reliable estimate of 
a model’s parameters. This limitation refl ects a more general characteristic of 
quantitative analysis of economic phenomena: the diffi culty of making statistical 
inferences from data that are not the result of experiments designed and 
controlled by the researcher. Exceptional conditions cannot be re-created at will, 
in the laboratory, for cognitive purposes; our experience will always be limited, 
partial and episodic. We must therefore make use of information outside the 
model, refer where possible to historical experience, and intervene on the basis of 
theory and good sense. 
Another obstacle to detecting the emergence of stability problems, and 
thus to taking corrective measures, is the nature of economic information, which 
is fragmentary, available with varying lags, and often characterized by a marked 
degree of approximation, which will eventually be reduced, possibly much 
later. Without accurate, timely and reliable information about what is actually 
happening, an episode of structural discontinuity may not be recognised as such 
until long after it fi rst appears. These considerations do not imply, however, that 
structural forecasting models (i.e. models in which the relations are not just a 
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Source: Source: Consensus Economics.
Note: The GDP growth rate in 2008 for Italy was -1 per cent and for the euro area it was 
0.7 per cent.
Figure 8: Revision of the GDP growth estimates for 2008: 
     Italy and the euro area
Source: Consensus Economics.
Figure 9: Revision of the GDP growth estimates for 2009: 
     Italy and the euro area
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statistical refl ection of the interaction between variables but are a quantitative 
representation, albeit approximate, of behavioural mechanisms) become 
completely unusable after a (real or apparent) break in their constituent relations. 
Anomalies in the relations between variables can only be recognised (and 
counter-measures taken, adapting and updating available instruments or creating new 
ones) if we have an instrument that can reliably represent such relations in “normal” 
conditions. Indeed this is already a very important signalling role. Structural models 
also allow us to trace the web of causal links between particular variables of interest. 
Thus, they do not just signal the appearance of discontinuities, they also help to 
identify which specifi c behavioural relation in the causal chain described by the 
models has changed with respect to the past. We can thus circumscribe the area 
affected by discontinuity, identify the nature of that discontinuity more easily and 
rapidly, and focus efforts to overcome it more effectively. 
Finally, once the type of discontinuity has been identifi ed, the actual 
structure of the model may help to assess the consequences for forecasting by 
exploiting other relations which remain valid. In the present crisis not all the 
behavioural relations of the models currently in use have been affected to the 
same extent. The ones that remain generally reliable could perhaps, pending more 
systematic and radical solutions, suggest how to correct the answers obtained 
instead with the relations that have the greatest diffi culty adapting to the new 
situation. In particular, it is worth trying to separate the forecasting errors, or 
revisions of forecasts, into their main determining factors: assumptions regarding 
policies (notably fi scal policies, but also market expectations regarding monetary 
policy); exogenous variables (for example, assumptions about the evolution of oil 
prices or the trend of world demand, on which, despite possible differences of 
opinion, the Bank of Italy, like the other national central banks, can only adhere 
to the evaluations agreed within the Eurosystem); and the changes in “initial 
conditions” underlined by Simon (see Figures 10 and 11). 
To assess the importance of the initial conditions we may look at Figure 
12, which shows the forecast for GDP growth in the Bank of Italy’s January 
2009 Economic Bulletin. As may be recalled, it showed a decline of 2 per cent 
in 2009 and a return to growth of 0.5 per cent in 2010. The pull exerted by the 
exceptionally negative estimate for the fourth quarter of 2008 had a considerable 
effect in this respect. In reality, Italian National Statistical Institute’s fi gures for 
the quarter were even more negative, refl ecting the underestimation in the model 
of the performance of world demand. Simply taking “mechanical” account of this 
and maintaining the gradual but constant exit from the crisis implicit in January’s 
projections, we move from a 2 to a 2.6 per cent contraction in GDP for this year. 
The key to tackling the problems created by discontinuity must lie in a 
better understanding of its nature and so in developing and specifying models in 
which the relations are based on parameters that remain stable in the long term. 
Research must therefore aim to identify suffi ciently fundamental and reasonably 
dependable mechanisms that do not change over time. 
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Note: Forecast for 2008 published in Banca d’Italia, Economic Bulletin, no. 49, July 2008. 
Contributions to the forecasting error due to the divergence of the hypotheses regarding 
the main exogenous variables with respect to the actual results and the revisions of the 
initial conditions.
Figure 10: Breakdown of the GDP forecasting error for Italy in 2008
Note:  Forecasts for 2009 published in Banca d’Italia, Economic Bulletin, nos. 49, July 2008 and 
51, January 2009. Contributions to the difference of the GDP growth estimate due to 
the revision of the hypotheses regarding the main exogenous variables and of the initial 
conditions.
Figure 11: Contributions to the revision of the 2009 GDP forecast 
       for Italy
ESTUDOS AVANÇADOS 23 (66), 2009210
Communicating and exploiting forecasts 
One area that has shown evident shortcomings in the present crisis 
lies between the production of forecasts and their utilization: end users 
(policy-makers, professional forecasters and the public at large) focus on 
the numbers summarizing the central or “basic” scenario (i.e. the one 
judged most likely), even though the products of forecasting are often more 
complex and include an evaluation of the size and direction of the risks 
surrounding the specifi c estimate. Such an evaluation usually consists in 
reporting the results of projections based on alternative hypotheses, thought 
to be less likely but nonetheless worth examining, particularly considering 
the often high macroeconomic cost if they were to come about, however 
unlikely. Virtually all forecasts of recent years have systematically indicated 
a risk that economic performance might not be as good as outlined in the 
central projection and that the feared downward adjustments to demand and 
output might be sudden and dramatic. These dangers were ascribed above 
all to the unsustainable global imbalances and their tendency to be absorbed 
suddenly, entailing sharp fl uctuations in output in the main economic areas 
and their reciprocal exchange rates. 
Source: Sources: Banca d’Italia, Economic Bulletin, no. 51, January 2009 and revisions of national 
accounts data.
Note:  The GDP growth estimate for 2008 not adjusted for the number of working days is equal 
to -1 per cent.Note: The GDP growth rate in 2008 for Italy was -1 per cent and for the 
euro area it was 0.7 per cent.
Figure 12: Estimates and forecasts of GDP growth rates
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When repeated warnings are issued about dangers that never seem 
to materialize, it is almost inevitable that they will eventually be ignored. 
The consequences of this very natural response may be particularly serious 
and disruptive, however: the long build-up of tension often culminates 
in an explosion, which will be all the more violent and dramatic the later 
it occurs. Perhaps the lesson to be learnt from recent experience is that a 
forecast should always be given and taken in its entirety: so, not only the 
central fi gure, but also the evaluations of the main risks, their size and the 
likelihood of their realization. When the dangers associated with alternative 
scenarios are extremely serious, even if not particularly likely, it may be 
better to adopt less than optimal policies with respect to the case in which 
the central forecast is realized, but ones that will safeguard against the 
occurrence of extreme events. When all is quiet, it may be unfortunate to 
have to renounce, as insurance as it were, part of the benefi ts of possibly 
more appropriate actions. But the crisis episodes remind us that the cost of 
not preparing for the worst may be very high. This means that not only must 
users of forecasts look more closely at the risk analysis, but that forecasters 
must learn to communicate their message with more determination and 
force, adapting their alarm signals to suit. 
Non-linear interaction between fi nancial and real variables 
The crisis emerged in correspondence with a particularly weak 
and underdeveloped problem area in the macroeconomic models in use: 
the point of interaction between fi nancial variables and the real sector. 
Simon’s observation regarding the correspondence between a model’s 
predictive capacity and the quality of the theory it contained is particularly 
relevant here. What is more, a critical re-examination of history suggests 
that fi nancial crises – especially when, as at present, they have such a 
violent impact on the banking sector – have generally had profound 
and particularly long-lasting consequences for the real economy. While 
it is reasonable to think that the infl uence of macroeconomic variables 
(prices, demand, output) on fi nancial variables is captured suffi ciently by 
the available forecasting tools, our understanding of the reverse effect is 
much more limited, indeed inadequate. In fact, the impact of fi nancial on 
macroeconomic variables (i.e. the situation in the present crisis) is only 
crudely represented in many models. 
Translating tensions in the interbank markets and banks’ funding 
problems into an assessment of their presumed impact on corporate 
investment and household consumption decisions is no easy task given our 
current state of knowledge. Those who have attempted to quantify the 
effects of a crisis have immediately run up against the obvious limitations 
of the available tools: there is no way (or still only a very rudimentary way) 
to represent the links between loan rationing and changes in the value of 
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assets that can be used as collateral on the one hand, and the real economic 
variables on the other. This problem can be addressed by adapting the tools 
we have, of necessity on an ad hoc basis, and this is what has been done 
to produce the forecast given in Figure 12, in which account is taken of 
the rapid loss of confi dence following the collapse of Lehman Brothers. In 
particular, it is posited that intermediaries’ greater fundraising costs may 
be refl ected in an increase in average lending rates that is greater than that 
defi ned only as a function of policy rates and obtained by estimating the 
relation between fi nancial operators’ risk exposure gauged by the increase in 
bond spreads and household and business funding costs. The effect of credit 
supply-side tensions, such as those emerging from qualitative information 
derived from the Bank Lending Survey, was taken into account by an 
equation associating a synthetic index constructed on the basis of the survey 
results with the forecasting errors of the equation explaining the evolution 
of investments in machinery and equipment. 
Obviously, recourse to ad hoc adjustments like this, even if they are 
necessary and possible using econometric models such as those considered 
here, cannot be the defi nitive answer. Many researchers both in research 
centres and in policy-making institutions have sought to overcome these 
limitations; and the efforts will multiply in the years to come. Above all 
there is an urgent need to improve our understanding of how the evolving 
macroeconomic framework may infl uence the stability of the fi nancial system 
and the state of health of banks, especially in the presence of extreme events. 
Periodic evaluations of this kind have been conducted for years now, some 
as part of projects coordinated by international organisations; these checks 
also need to be made more systematic, more intense and more robust. But 
the serious diffi culties encountered by econometric models in forecasting 
the effects of the fi nancial crisis may necessitate a review of some of the 
theoretical paradigms related to the role of risk and uncertainty in agents’ 
decision-making, and not only as regards fi nancial decisions, in particular 
at times of marked deviations from normal conditions. Obviously this may 
require discussing very complex problems, such as the possibility of making 
use, to gauge the probability of a credit crunch (with its non-linear effects 
on investment and production), of the credit market data themselves. 
5. Concluding remarks on models and forecasts 
The large and, worse, growing imbalances in current payments, 
the excessively low saving rates, the over-indebtedness of households 
in America and other countries, and the prolonged and overly buoyant 
growth of the world economy signalled the unsustainability of global 
market conditions and a risk of recession that could not be ignored even 
in the euro area, where the external payments are in balance and monetary 
conditions are stable. However, the severity of the ensuing crisis has gone 
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far beyond the forecasts and its behaviour has highlighted vast information 
gaps, particularly as regards the workings of the fi nancial structures and 
interactions between fi nance and the economy. Although there has been 
no lack of deeply pessimistic, and in some cases quite accurate, forecasts 
and evaluations regarding both the dynamics and the effects of the crisis 
that began in 2007, almost all of them have been presented – and perhaps 
it could not have been otherwise – as greater or lesser risks of deviation 
from a core trend that is certainly negative but not dramatically so. The 
economic policy response, though rapid in its monetary component, wide-
ranging in its revision of the rules and governance of fi nancial markets and 
institutions, and impressive overall in terms of present and future budgets 
has nevertheless not yet succeeded in countering a steady loss of confi dence 
that has spread from the fi nancial sector to the real economy. It is too soon 
though, not only to evaluate the effects of these policies, but even to draw 
any profound lessons from the features and course of the current global 
crisis. In any event, there is a fairly high risk that we will only emerge from 
the crisis slowly and with a basically modest rate of recovery. 
In general, the effects of economic policy actions are not immediate; 
on the contrary, they often arrive a considerable time after the decisions are 
taken. Prudent policy choices can only be made on the basis of evaluations 
of future conditions and trends. Economic policy necessarily requires 
models that can produce reasonably reliable forecasts; that can aggregate 
and organize large, diverse quantities of data; and that can promptly signal 
any deviation from the behaviour that prevailed in the past. In this regard, I 
am still convinced that an econometric model, if used intelligently and not 
mechanically, constitutes a precious tool for making quantitative evaluations. 
Simply because one forecasting tool proves unreliable, this does not 
mean that economic policy should no longer make use of models: there is 
actually no practical alternative to refi ning those that exist to surmount their 
shortcomings. This calls for an understanding of the origin and nature of 
the errors and then developing new ways of interpretation and innovative 
techniques, which in turn will have to be set aside when, in the future, 
unprecedented shocks show the limits of the new generation of models.  
The imperfections of analytical forecasting tools are clear; to some 
extent the solutions can already be outlined; it is necessary that efforts along 
the lines indicated be prompt and effective. Economic policy management 
cannot very long do without reliable quantitative information, especially in 
troubled and uncertain times; such information can only be obtained using 
models that have been adjusted on the basis of past experience. Obviously, in 
order to be useful for economic policy-making, these forecasts, though they 
may be conditional, must factor in data that are not included in the present 
models and also allow for judgment based on experience and theory; as I 
have already said, they must not be “mechanical”. The time has not yet come 
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when we can consider the “economic problem” as a “matter for specialists 
– like dentistry”, as Keynes, in 1930, would have liked. Unfortunately, that 
“splendid” time is still to come, as is amply demonstrated by the present 
crisis, in which economists will manage “to get themselves thought of as 
humble, competent people, on a level with dentists” (Keynes, 1933 p. 373). 
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